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Abstract 
 
The paper explores the attitudes of medical physicians towards adverse incident reporting 
in health care, with particular focus on the inhibiting factors or barriers to participation. It 
is recognised that there are major barriers to medical reporting, especially the ‘culture of 
blame’ these is a ‘culture of blame’. There are, however, few detailed qualitative 
accounts of medical culture as it relates to incident reporting. Drawing on a two-year 
qualitative case study, this paper presents data gathered from 28 semi-structured 
interviews with specialist physicians. The findings suggest that blame certainly inhibits 
medical reporting, but other cultural issues were also significant. It was commonly 
accepted by doctors that errors are an ‘inevitable’ and potentially unmanageable feature 
of medical work and incident reporting was therefore ‘pointless’. It was also found that 
reporting was discouraged by an anti-bureaucratic sentiment and rejection of excessive 
administrative duties. Doctors were also apprehensive about the increased potential for 
managers and non-physicians to engage in the regulation of medical quality through the 
use of incident data. The paper argues that the promotion of incident reporting must 
engage with more than the ubiquitous ‘culture of blame’ and instead address the ‘culture 
of medicine’, especially as it relates to the collegial and professional control of quality. 
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Introduction 
 
International research has shown that errors in the delivery of health care are a major 
threat to patient safety (Brennan and Leape 1991, Wilson et al. 1995, Vincent et al. 2001) 
In the National Health Service (NHS) of England and Wales it has been reported that 
mistakes or ‘adverse events’ in the delivery of health care are experienced in around 10% 
of inpatient admissions (Department of Health 2000, Vincent et al. 2001). It has been 
calculated that the human cost of these mistakes could be more that 40’000 lives a year 
with a financial cost to the service of over £2billion in additional care (Department of 
Health 2000).  
 
A ‘patient safety’ agenda is now well established in countries such as Australia, the US 
and the UK (Department of Health 2000, Institute of Medicine 1999, Wolff and Bourke 
2000). In the NHS, health policies have adopted the principles and practices of error 
management that have been successfully utilised in other industries, such as aviation or 
nuclear energy (Department of Health 2000, 2001; Reason and Hobbs 2003). Here the 
theories of cognitive and social psychology, ergonomics and ‘human factors’ have 
combined to produce a new orthodoxy of error management (Reason 1997). From this 
perspective threats to safety are elaborated along two dimensions. The first recognises the 
individual component where cognitive lapses or aberrations lead to active errors. The 
second emphasises the latent factors that enable or exacerbate human error within 
organisational systems (Reason 1997). Human behaviour is regarded as inherently error-
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prone but importantly these errors are facilitated or amplified by actions, decisions, and 
plans made elsewhere, or ‘upstream’ within the system. 
 
The management of errors requires an acceptance of error with consideration given to the 
relationship between individual human behaviour and the factors that influence this 
behaviour (Reason and Hobbs 2003). In practice, error management requires that 
organisations learn from their threats to safety, identify the underlying causes, and seek 
out opportunities for change. This commonly involves the introduction of designated 
incident reporting systems that enable front-line staff to communicate their safety 
concerns and experiences of error to those responsible for safety and quality. These 
incident reports then furnish organisations with the necessary information and capacity to 
make proactive and remedial changes. 
 
It is recognised, however, that there are considerable barriers to the successful 
implementation of error management and incident reporting systems (Barach and Small 
2000). In the safety management literature, significance is given to the cultural barriers 
and the need to create a ‘safety culture’ (Helmreich and Merritt 2001, Reason 1997, 
Reason and Hobbs 2003). Helmreich and Merritt (2001) have shown how safety 
management must navigate national, organisational and professional cultures where 
issues as diverse as individual responsibility, gender divisions, teamwork, competence 
levels, transparency and punishment interact to shape cultural attitudes towards safety. 
Considerable significance is given to the fear of blame or the ‘culture of blame’ that 
inhibits participation in incident reporting. It is argued that people are disinclined to be 
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open an honest about their experiences of error because of the deep-seated assumption 
that they will be found at fault and held individually responsible or punished for the 
event. As such, the fear of blame and retribution are seen as major cultural barriers to 
incident reporting. For Reason (1997) this culture of blame arises, in the widest sense, 
from the primacy accorded to individual autonomy in Western culture and as such 
individual responsibility for mistake or blame is apportioned when ‘things go wrong’. As 
such there is an assumption that openness and transparency, including forms of incident 
reporting, make possible the allocation of individual responsibility and therefore serve to 
distribute blame and possibly secure some form of retribution. Reason has argued that for 
error management to make a meaningful contribution to safety it is necessary to break 
free from the “blame cycle” and promote a “reporting culture”. This he argues can be 
achieved through practical measures, such as the de-identification of reporters, protecting 
reporters and whistle-blowers from unwarranted reprisals, and providing meaningful 
feedback that highlights the purpose of error management. More recently the notion of a 
‘safety culture’ has been elaborated to suggest that safety is driven by a “learning culture” 
that actively seeks out previous experiences of error in an effort to ensure they do not 
happen again. This is underpinned by a ‘reporting culture’ where staff routinely 
document and communicate their experiences of error to enable this learning. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that high levels of reporting are secured through the creation 
of a ‘just culture’ that recognising human fallibility but importantly establishes clear 
expectations of responsibility and does not unfairly or routinely blame or punish those 
who make mistakes.   
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The ‘patient safety’ agenda in the NHS has embraced the principles of human factors and 
practices of error management (Department of Health 2000, 2001; NPSA 2001, 2003). 
The National Reporting and Learning System (NRLA) is currently being implemented 
across the health service to enable front-line staff to record and report their experiences of 
error, and it is anticipated that through the collection of this information error producing 
factors can be identified and managed. It is recognised, however, that there are 
considerable barriers to staff participation in incident reporting and significant levels of 
‘under-reporting’, especially for medical physicians (Barach and Small 2000, Coles et al 
2001, Vincent et al 1999). Significant factors included individual uncertainties about the 
purpose of reporting, the practical design of incident forms, systems of organisational 
communication and feedback and apprehension about the unjust consequences of 
reporting (Coles et 2001, Vincent et al 1999). 
 
Significant among the barriers to incident reporting in health care is the ‘culture of 
blame’ that inhibits reporting because of the expectation that those found at fault will be 
individually held accountable or responsible (Coles et al 2001, Department of Health 
2000, Vincent et al 1999). Although this is widely recognised in the error management 
literature, it is important to put this within the context of health care cultures, especially 
medical professional cultures. Helmreich and Merritt’s (1998) analysis of work and 
safety cultures in aviation and medicine makes the point that professional groups are 
characterised by high levels of self-esteem, invulnerability and denial. As such reporting 
is discouraged because of a fear that they could reveal specific flaws in professional 
competence and individual ability, and provide a basis for professional sanctions or 
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punishment. In addition, Lawton and Parker’s (2002) study of incident reporting found 
that reporting is constrained by the specific occupational hierarchies of health care where 
professionals are typically reluctant to report their experiences of error, rule violation or 
poor performance to senior colleagues because of the cultural taboos associated with 
whistle-blowing and the assumption that it could inhibit career development. 
 
These studies of blame and incident reporting give an indication of other more deep-
seated and long-standing cultural dimensions of health care that have an important 
bearing on the implementation of incident reporting. Specifically, other studies have 
shown how the medical profession is characterised by a ‘closed culture’ that inhibits 
openness (Department of Health 2000, Kennedy 2001). Rosenthal’s (1995, 1999) study 
of ‘problem doctors’ found that physicians generally accepted mistakes as a necessary 
feature of their work. It was expected, however, that any issues of competence or wrong-
doing should be addressed through ‘in-house’ and ‘collegial’ practices that served to 
maintain the exclusivity of medical knowledge whilst simultaneously limiting exposure 
to non-professional groups. Allsop and Mulcahy’s (1998) study of patient complaints 
found that physicians regarded complaints as a challenge to their expertise and technical 
competence, and therefore constituted a threat to their professional identity. However, it 
was also found that the shared feelings of vulnerability and the loss of status serve to 
promote a collective understanding and attitude towards complaints that maintains 
professional control and identity in the face of these external or non-professional 
challenges. These works highlight the significance of collegiality in medical culture, and 
accordingly illustrate the importance of internal or self regulation to medical 
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professionalism. It is well-established how the regulatory character of medicine, 
including both formal and informal practices of occupational control, have served to 
ensure professional monopoly in the evaluation of medical work and exclude the 
participation of non-professional groups in the management of technical performance 
(Allsop and Mulcahy 1996, Friedson 1970, Lupton 1998, Rosenthal 1995). This broader 
theoretical context of professional regulation and collegiality is therefore central to the 
issue of medical reporting.  
 
Drawing from this theoretical background and with specific focus on the medical 
profession, this paper aims to explore the cultural attitudes and barriers to incident 
reporting in the NHS. Importantly, the success of incident reporting is to a large extent 
premised on the creation a ‘just culture’ that counters the fear of blame, encourages 
openness and underpins a ‘culture of reporting’ (Department of Health 2001, NPSA 
2003). Initially, this work suggests that the notion and significance of ‘blame’ presented 
in policy is somewhat vague, whilst there is little current empirical data to show how the 
‘culture of blame’ influences medical attitudes towards incident reporting. Secondly, 
although the fear of blame may indeed be a substantial barrier to reporting, there is little 
consideration for other cultural factors that could also influence participation in incident 
reporting. This paper therefore aims to provide an empirical account of the medical 
attitudes towards incident reporting, and with consideration given to the broader socio-
cultural theories of medical professionalism (e.g. Freidson 1970, Rosenthal 1995), it aims 
to move beyond the ubiquitous concern with a ‘blame culture’ and engage the other deep-
seated cultural features of medical professionalism. 
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Methods 
 
The results reported here were gathered between 2001 and 2003 from a larger qualitative 
study of clinical risk management and incident reporting. The setting for the study was a 
single medium-sized NHS District General Hospital in the English Midlands. The 
organisational site was selected because it was found to be typical of other acute hospitals 
in the NHS that were currently coming to terms with patient safety policies.  
 
Interviews constituted the predominant method of data collection. In total 42 interviews 
were conducted with medical and managerial staff from across the hospital. Initially, 12 
respondents were ‘theoretically sampled’ (Strauss and Corbin 1999) on the basis of their 
participation in the management and administration of quality improvement, clinical 
risks, and mistakes in the hospital. This included 9 senior managers (one of which was 
interviewed twice) and 3 senior medical representatives. A second sample of 29 
interviews was conducted with staff working in five specialist departments in the 
hospital, including Anaesthesia, Acute Medicine, Obstetrics, Rehabilitation and Surgery. 
This representative sample comprised 25 specialist consultant-grade physicians (5 from 
each department) and 4 local risk managers. Importantly, the data used in this paper is 
drawn from the 28 interviews with medical staff (3 senior medical representatives and 25 
specialist physicians). 
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The interviews followed a broad thematic guide that was concerned with gathering 
occupational narratives, accounts of recent developments and changes in the management 
of safety and risks, descriptive accounts of hospital and localised incident reporting 
systems, attitudes and practices towards incident reporting and risk management, and 
issues about the control and management of medical performance.  Each interview was 
prefaced by a review of the study’s aims and all respondents were made aware of the 
ethical considerations before acquiring their consent. The interviews lasted between 40 
minutes and 2 hours with an average of approximately an hour. 
 
It is recognised that qualitative interviews rarely provide an unproblematic source of data. 
Furthermore, given that ‘medical mistakes’ are a high-profile and sensitive subject 
seemingly shrouded in secrecy and associated with a ‘blame culture’ (Department of 
Health 2000) it is especially necessary to consider the implications for validity and 
reliability in this study. With regards to the validity of the interview data, it is recognised 
that participants could have been particularly apprehensive about discussing their 
mistakes with a non-peer and an ‘outsider’. It could be speculated that the interview 
responses were implicitly concerned with portraying an ‘image’ of competence and not 
providing information that could be used to blame or negatively characterise participants. 
Specifically, the full and honest participation of physicians in the interviews could have 
been influenced by the same cultural factors or barriers that inhibit medical reporting. 
With regards to the reliability of the data it is necessary to consider the limitations of 
drawing substantial conclusions about medical culture based on only 28 interviews. 
Given the prevalence of quantitative data in this area (e.g Parker and Lawton 2002), 
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however, it is believed possible to meaningfully contextualise this data within the 
existing theoretical and empirical literature. 
 
All interviews were electronically recorded and transcribed verbatim into a word 
processing package. The data was then imported into the qualitative data analysis 
computer package Atlas ti for the purposes of coding and content analysis. Initially, this 
involved manually examining the interview data to identify descriptions, cases, 
occurrences and attitudes in the talk of respondents. A pre-determined coding frame was 
not developed in advance of the study, but throughout the indexing and coding process 
implicit consideration was given to theoretical and policy issues, as well as to emergent 
and unanticipated and ‘grounded’ themes within the data. Following the comparative 
approach outlined by Strauss and Corbin (ref), these categories and codes were 
systematically compared and contrasted, with reference to the primary data, to verify the 
views of individual respondents and to identify contradictions and conceptual 
relationships within the data. This coding process contributed to the development of 
empirically driven themes that are used to characterise the attitudes and values of doctors. 
These are explored in the following section with example quotations to illustrate the 
findings and interpretation given.  
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Results: cultural barriers to reporting 
 
The fear of blame and the fear of reporting 
 
All doctors involved in the research made reference to the “blame thing” or a “blame 
culture” when expressing their apprehensions about incident reporting. It was evident 
from the way doctors discussed blame that it was perceived to involve the unfair or 
inappropriate allocation of responsibility for poor performance or outcomes, and possibly 
the unwarranted recourse to reprisals and punishment. It was also evident that there were 
different sources of blame that also made doctors apprehensive about being open or 
reporting. The most commonly cited source of blame was associated with the “the 
public” and “the press”, and through association “the Trust”, which strive to make 
doctors culpable for care that does not meet particular standards or expectations. This 
external blame was compounded by the increased presence of litigation in health care, 
and like the findings of Allsop and Mulcahy (1998) this seemed to question professional 
competence and promote feelings of vulnerability. Another source of blame stemmed 
from the occupational or internal aspects of medical practice where it was felt that 
increased openness about individual competence could lead to the questioning of 
professional practice and lead to poor references, reprimands from a senior colleague or 
could tarnish the reputation of the consultant. This internal blame appears to reinforce 
and develop the problem of occupational hierarchies identified by Lawton and Parker 
(2002). 
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“it’s partly culture, its fear of litigation…and its partly the old culture of 
preferment in terms of jobs and things, and how consultants and seniors could blot 
your career” (Respondent 6). 
 
The unjust and inappropriate allocation of blame, whether from inside or outside the 
profession, appeared to negatively influence the attitudes of physicians about incident 
reporting and discourage participation. The majority of doctors suggested that their 
apprehensions about blame discouraged reporting because it provided the Trust or 
colleagues with information about individual weaknesses that could be used to “point the 
finger at clinicians who are trying to do their best” (Respondent 30). 
 
“it seems just like another witch hunt against clinical staff on the front line who 
are doing their best” (Respondent 20). 
 
“And there’s a culture of not wanting to fill these things in and wondering what 
sort of blame is going to come your way” (Respondent 5). 
 
More than half of the participants gave anecdotal accounts of colleagues who had been 
“reprimanded” or “investigated” following the submission of a report. Although specific 
details were rarely given, there were some common ‘stories’ such as the junior doctor 
who was suspended and the doctor who used as a scapegoat following a drug-error. 
These ‘folk tales’ appear to symbolise and perpetuate the feelings of unease and the fear 
of blame, associated with making incident reports and helped to justify not reporting. One 
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major anxiety was that incident reports would be used by managers to store information 
about bad practice that could be used at a later date in the event of medico-legal disputes.  
 
Despite the efforts of policy-makers, hospital managers and professional leaders to 
promote a “just culture” and encourage medical reporting, the interview data indicated 
that doctors remained sceptical and apprehensive about the purpose and application of 
incident data. As such it was apparent that the idea of no blame or fair blame were 
regarded as rhetorical and possibly even managerial strategies and therefore they had 
failed to make any substantial impact on the doctors.  This reference to managerial 
scrutiny is further developed below.  
 
“Although that culture has changed I still think there are a lot of people who 
would be reluctant to [report] if they could get away with it because there would 
still be a fear of retribution” (Respondent 27). 
 
Alternatively, a small group of participants, mainly senior medical representatives and 
clinical directors, were more aware and supportive of recent developments in ‘patient 
safety’. For these doctors incident reporting was certainly regarded as a practical 
mechanism for encouraging quality or service improvement, but fundamentally this was 
premised on the capacity for reporting to shift the responsibility and blame for poor 
quality care further up the organisational hierarchy. Specifically, it was suggested that 
incident reports could be used to reinforce claims for organisational change by 
demonstrating the need for more resources, equipment, or staff. Selectively embracing 
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some of the principles of human factors, these doctors identified the source of error 
within the wider organisation and management of service and not in their own clinical 
work. In consequence, incident reporting not only served as a tool for legitimising the 
request for change, but also allocated the responsibility for poor quality away from 
medical practice. It could be argued therefore that rather than exhibiting a desire for a 
“just culture” or “no blame”, these doctors were attempting to “shift the blame” through 
the use of an incident report.  
 
For all the doctors involved in the study the fear and allocation of ‘blame’ certainly 
influenced their attitudes towards openness and their participation in incident reporting. 
Generally it was found that reporting could serve to present opportunities for both 
medical and non-medical groups to scrutinise performance and damage professional 
reputations and perceptions of competence. Only when the blame for poor performance 
could be allocated elsewhere did the small group of senior doctors recognise the value of 
reporting. It is worth considering that the prominence of ‘blame’ in the talk of doctors 
may reflect the growing significance of the subject in recent policies. The notion of a 
blame culture may therefore provide doctors with an obvious and legitimate justification 
for not reporting when in actual fact other cultural issues could be interpreted as 
potentially more influential in shaping medical attitudes towards and participation in 
incident reporting.  
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The inevitability of error and the purpose of reporting 
 
It has been demonstrated elsewhere how the inherent and ‘permanent’ uncertainty of 
medicine has necessitated that doctors accept the risks of error in their work, to the extent 
that it has become a defining characteristic of medical culture and practice (Fox 1975, 
Rosenthal 1995, 1999). Moreover, the ambiguities, variability and “gaps” of medical 
work have been central to the development of collegial practices for the control of risk 
and error (Bosk 1979, Fox 1975, Paget 2004, Rosenthal 1995). Similarly, this research 
revealed that far from working on the premise of “perfection” (Leape 1999), doctors 
regarded errors as an inevitable and sometimes beneficial dimension of their work. It was 
found that the majority of physicians believed all human activity was prone to error: with 
a small group of doctors directly quoting Alexander Pope’s dictum “to err is human” 
(Pope 1709).  
 
“Human error is always going to occur” (Respondent 15) 
 
The inherent uncertainty of medicine was often expressed in the interviews by 
respondents referring to their work as “less of a science and more of an art” (Respondent 
12) or emphasising the “trial and error” character of medical practice (Respondent 26). It 
appeared that the cultural acceptance of uncertainty and complexity necessitated that 
doctors also accept the inevitability of mistake in their work. Not only was a degree of 
error regarded as acceptable, but reinforcing the work of Bosk (1979) it was claimed to 
be beneficial for the learning processes of trainee and junior doctors. Furthermore, errors 
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were widely accepted as an inevitable consequence of working within a complex 
organisation such as the NHS, where the work of the individual clinicians is dependant 
upon the activities of many other people and organisational processes.  
 
The perceived inevitability of error and its acceptance in medical culture are extremely 
significant for understanding medical attitudes towards in incident reporting.  In one 
regard it could be suggested that this feature of medical culture provides the basis for a 
shared and collective rationale to bolster individual self-esteem and safeguard against 
feelings of incompetence, on the grounds that errors will always happen regardless of 
ability, and in consequence this may help to explain and mitigate errors ‘after the fact’ or 
ex post facto. More significantly, however, it could also be the case that the inevitability 
of error leads to more than their acceptance, but also to their ‘normalisation’. This is 
where some common mistakes are regarded as routine and normal within the context of 
medical work, and in consequence these events are not perceived as problematic or worth 
reporting. For example, the distinction between error and “complication” or “side-effect” 
was often vague in the talk of doctors and served to question the relevance of reporting.  
 
In addition, medical participation in incident reporting was more explicitly questioned in 
terms of its capacity to actually tackle the ‘trial and error’ nature of medical work and 
make meaningful service improvements. Given that errors were regarded as inevitable 
doctors often regarded reporting as ‘pointless’ or a ‘waste of time’ on the grounds that 
these mistakes could never be fully eradicated and instead they should just be accepted. 
In consequence participants could see little purpose for incident reporting.  
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“What good does it do? It’s not like it could ever make us error-free.” 
(Respondent 5) 
 
“The best intentioned doctor will make mistakes, there but for the Grace of God… 
but you don’t report all these, what would be the point” (Respondent 27). 
 
“What am I going to get out of it, or what is the patient going to get out of it, or 
what are my colleagues going to get out of it, and if they don’t see anything 
valuable or a valuable learning lesson then people don’t do it [report]” 
(Respondent 26). 
 
As these quotes demonstrate, the doctors remained sceptical about how incident reporting 
could contribute to service improvement given the uncertainty of medicine and 
inevitability of error. Accordingly, the majority of respondents were perplexed about the 
“end point” or ultimate purpose of the scheme. On the one hand this may demonstrate a 
lack of awareness about how reporting can contribute to service quality. On the other 
hand it may be reflective of a deeper division between medical and managerial 
approaches to quality improvement. The interview data appeared to indicate that doctors 
did not value incident reporting because it failed to recognise that mistakes are an 
inevitable feature of medical practices and, importantly, they are based ‘within’ the 
uncertainties of medical knowledge and practice. In consequence, the doctors tended to 
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regard incident reporting as a managerial exercise and questioned its contribution to 
service quality.  
 
“So I think some of these things get labelled with ‘it’s just collecting data for the 
sake of it’, because somebody in management has to tick boxes and send off to 
the Department of Health” (Respondent 10). 
 
“It struck me that the work of risk management is about guards around emergency 
exits on the stairs…but we haven’t seen to the everyday events that are 
happening. So I don’t see doctors filling those in” (Respondent 13). 
 
The doctors therefore explicitly questioned the purpose of incident reporting and its 
contribution to service improvement. As suggested above in the discussion of ‘blame’, 
doctors were indeed supportive of reporting when it could be used to “flag up topical 
issues” or persuade managers to release additional resources. In this regard these quotes 
suggest that doctors often question how ‘managers’ prioritise the allocation of resources 
and the management of risks. It may be the case therefore that whilst this remains the 
case doctor will also remain sceptical about the contribution that incident reporting could 
have to their work. Conversely, for those doctors involved in the Confidential Enquiries, 
such as Peri-operative Deaths or Maternal Deaths, this professional-based reporting was 
more valued because it was based ‘within’ medical practices, and therefore implicitly 
accommodated the uncertainties of medicine and was perceived as making a more 
meaningful contribution to service quality.  
 21 
 
 
Rejection of bureaucracy and managerial scrutiny 
 
A prominent theme that characterised the views of doctors and emerged from the issues 
raised above was a strong revulsion of what was often termed “bureaucracy”, “red tape”, 
“admin” and “management”. The difficult relationship between medicine and 
management is well-documented elsewhere and shows how the changes in health service 
organisation and management have often challenged medical status and authority (e.g. 
Strong and Robinson 1991, Harrison and Pollitt 1995, Harrison 2002). This research 
revealed how, possibly as a reflection of these changes, doctors seemed to have a deep-
seated loathing of rule-based and managerial practices that were diametrically opposed to 
the ideals of individualism, discretion and autonomy that characterise medical practice 
and culture (Freidson 1970, Lupton 1999). This aspect of medical culture had a 
significant impact on the participation of doctors within risk management systems and 
incident reporting.  
 
When the doctors were asked about their experiences and involvement in incident 
reporting their responses referred to the excessive time required for form filling that 
could be better spent with patients and the menial nature of paperwork that was somehow 
beneath medical expertise.   
 
 22 
“I think the culture is never going to be there for a mass of form filling” 
(Respondent 9). 
 
“Doctors are the worst people to follow mandatory rules, if there is anything 
mandatory doctors will think of a way for somebody else to do it” (Respondent 
14). 
 
“Well reporting, it’s a big brother thing.” (Respondent 5) 
 
The doctors were particularly concerned that the growing number of bureaucratic hospital 
procedures would reduce their capacity for “real” medical work. This may demonstrate 
the importance of ‘the patient’ and ‘health improvement’ to medical culture, where 
administrative and ‘managerial’ procedures are avoided and shunned because they are not 
seen as directly contributing to medical work or patient care.  On the one hand this 
viewpoint, however, could have been offered by the participants as a reasonable 
explanation for delegating or avoiding administrative tasks. On the other hand it also 
demonstrates the clear scepticism that doctors have in the capacity for managers to 
contribute to medical work. Furthermore, it was also found that there was a deep-seated 
assumption that these activities were particularly ‘un-medical’ and ‘un-professional’. 
Specifically, the doctors were highly critical of the ability for non-medical groups to 
sufficiently understand and interpret medical errors because of the clear lack of expertise. 
It was suggested by over half of the participants that managers with no front-line clinical 
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experience would struggle to understand the ‘realities’ of care provision and would 
evaluate incidents “out of context” and without legitimacy. 
 
“with clinical incidents managers don't really know much, they may clutter things 
up with all sorts of policies and regulations and so on, but they don't directly 
contribute to  dealing with the incidents”  (Respondent 5) 
 
“I think the worry is that managers don’t actually understand medicine. I see 
things differently, I deal with different things, but management deal with other 
things, its all about quality but they can’t understand what I do clinically” 
(Respondent 15) 
 
The anti-bureaucratic sentiment of medical culture may also be demonstrative of the 
desire to undermine and curb the enhanced managerial scrutiny of medical practice, 
especially the evident potential for incident reporting to directly engage with medical 
quality. When this theme was pursued with the respondents it was found that doctors not 
only feared the potential blame that could be brought about by revealing mistakes, but 
more fundamentally there was anxiety about the new opportunities that incident reporting 
would provide for none medical groups to survey and evaluate practice. For some this 
was expressed as a direct challenge to the regulatory character of medicine, whilst for 
others it was felt that medical work would soon become the target of performance 
management. Given the significance of this anti-managerial and bureaucratic feeling, it 
was unsurprising to find there was little support for the expansion of incident reporting, 
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especially since it may reinforce any concerns or fears about blame, as well as 
introducing new non-professional regulatory practices. 
 
“I see it more and more as hemming in and putting the clinicians under scrutiny” 
(Respondent 12). 
 
“I think there is a potential problem with a them and us situation where there are 
people working hard in a clinical situation and some manager sitting in an office 
somewhere is going to look at the incident forms and come down on us in a 
judgemental way” (Respondent 25). 
 
“My personal view is that if it’s done in a controlling manner then you may get 
results but how valid are they?” (Respondent 2) 
 
 
Divergent occupational responsibilities and expertise 
 
In the light of the above findings one of the most interesting themes in the interviews 
with doctors was the sentiment that incident reporting was designed and operated 
primarily for other occupational groups that were more suited to bureaucratic procedures, 
especially ‘nursing’. Doctors often claimed that incident reporting grew out of the 
nursing profession because its culture was familiar with ‘form filling’ and ‘paper work’ 
and more amenable to managerial control.  
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“The nurses tend to fill in absolutely anything, that sounds a bit unfair…but there 
is also this element of ‘I’m filling this in to cover myself and I have passed it 
on’…. You can see the strengths in both systems, while one system under-reports 
but avoids bureaucracy the other one is obviously very safe but creates a mass of 
writing and work” (Respondent 26). 
 
“Doctors regard those as nurse-led and about falls in the hospital” (Respondent 
13). 
 
The way in which doctors talked about incident reporting and nursing was often off-hand 
and demeaning, but at a cultural level it may be the case that for doctors incident 
reporting is associated with divergent forms of professionalism and quality improvement. 
The way doctors talked about their own work in relation to nursing tended to emphasise 
the importance of their individual expertise and discretion, while the work of nurses was 
regarded as more rule-based, process driven and procedural. This may demonstrate an 
underlying assumption that medical practice is characterised by a special kind of 
expertise, experience and reflective practice that is different from nursing. In 
consequence, reporting is not regarded as an appropriate tool to engage with medical 
quality, but because nursing lacks this special quality, it is believed that reporting is an 
appropriate device for enhancing the quality of nursing care. The findings suggest that the 
longstanding association of reporting with nursing and the perceived lack of relevance of 
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reporting to medicine further discourages doctors from using incident reporting as a 
mechanism of quality improvement. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The interviews with physicians revealed several significant themes that characterised the 
way in which they understood their work and their participation in incident reporting. 
These reveal interesting features of medical culture in general and identify important 
cultural barriers to incident reporting.  The fear of blame from both peers and non-peers 
was certainly found to discourage medical reporting on the basis that reporting could 
damage professional reputations or led to unjustified reprisals. On a reflexive note, it 
could be argued that prominence of the ‘blame culture’ as a justification for not reporting 
was found precisely because of its prominence in policy and managerial discourse and it 
therefore provides a widely recognised reason for not reporting. However, the research 
demonstrated the need to look beyond the ubiquitous focus on ‘blame’ and consider other 
cultural facets of medicine.  In particular, it was found that the perceived inevitability of 
error provides doctors with a justification for not reporting on the basis that it could never 
substantially prevent these mistakes from occurring because they are an implicit feature 
of complex medical work. Moreover, the acceptance of error goes beyond questioning the 
purpose of reporting and leads to the normalisation of error to the extent that they can be 
discounted as problematic issues that require reporting. The doctors also expressed 
anxiety about the proliferation of bureaucratic techniques in their work that not only take 
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them away from ‘real’ medical work, but more insidiously represent new devices to 
monitor and evaluate medical performance.  Given the apparent ‘un-medical’ qualities of 
reporting, it is unsurprising to find that some doctors believed it was primarily devised 
for non-medical groups. Together these findings go beyond the problems of ‘blame’ and 
identify other deep-seated cultural attributes of medicine that inhibit incident reporting.  
 
Reflecting on Allsop and Mulcahy’s (1998) analysis of medical attitudes towards 
complaints, this study reveals not just the cultural barriers to reporting but also the 
underlying cultural significance of collegiality. On the one hand this serves to maintain 
the external image of medicine and protect the identity of physicians from unsympathetic 
criticism. This can be seen in the paradoxical accounts of medicine, which has been 
simultaneously described as driven by the veneer of invulnerability and perfection 
(Helmreich and Merritt 2003, Leape 1999), but also culturally accepting the inherent 
uncertainties, risks and errors of practice (Fox 1975, Rosenthal 1995). There is an 
apparent divergence, therefore, between how medicine is portrayed and received in the 
wider society and how doctors themselves understand their work. As such it is not just 
the fear of blame that inhibits medical reporting but also the desire to protect the 
symbolic façade of professional competence, and the identity and status of the physicians 
with the patient.  
 
On the other hand, the rejection of incident reporting also demonstrates the desire to 
maintain the collegial or ‘in-house’ control of medical quality issues. By not reporting 
doctors deny non-professional groups the opportunity to engage in the bureaucratic 
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surveillance and regulation of medical work, whilst reinforcing the cultural norm that 
professional learning comes through individual reflection or peer-based practices (Allsop 
and Mulcahy 1996, Harrison 2002, Rosenthal 1995). It has been well documented how 
medicine is characterised by notions of ‘clinical autonomy’ and ‘self-regulation’ 
(Freidson 1970) and, despite re-evaluations of these concepts (Evetts 2000), they 
continue to shape medical culture and practice. Furthermore, this research shows that 
these professional ideals could also shape attitudes towards incident reporting because, 
unlike collegial systems, it is regarded as un-medical, managerial and ineffective in 
dealing with the inevitable errors of medicine. As such medical reporting is discouraged 
because it is perceived as further extension of managerialism and an erosion of 
professional status. 
 
These findings suggest that rather than focussing simply on the “blame culture” of health 
care or medicine, it would be more appropriate to understand how the ‘culture of 
medicine’ in general relates to incident reporting. The fear of blame is certainly a barrier 
to reporting but this could be as much rhetoric as reality, whilst other more deep-seated 
socio-cultural features of medical professionalism have also been found to inhibit 
reporting. In consequence establishing a “reporting culture” or even a “safety culture” 
requires more than removing blame or establishing reporting processes, but requires 
engaging with the complex culture of medicine. This could include stimulating medical 
ownership or control in the processes of reporting and enhancing awareness about the 
function of reporting.  
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In summary, the qualitative data reveals important facets of medical culture that relate to 
incident reporting. Although the fear of blame is certainly an influential cultural issue, it 
was not in itself the only dimension that shaped medical attitudes towards and 
participation in reporting. As such it may be more appropriate to move beyond the 
concept of a ‘blame culture’ and the creation of a ‘just culture’, and recognise the more 
complex occupational and professional cultures that relate to reporting. 
 
 30 
References 
 
Allsop, J. and Mulcahy, L. (1996) Regulating Medical Work, Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
 
Allsop, J. and Mulcahy, L. (1998) “Maintaining professional identities: doctor’s 
responses to complaints”, Sociology of Health and Illness, vol.20(6), pp.802-24. 
 
Barach, P. and Small, S. (2000) “Reporting and preventing medical mishaps: lessons 
from non-medical near miss reporting”, British Medical Journal, vol.320, pp.579-63. 
 
Bosk, C. (1979) Forgive and Remember, London: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Brennan, T. and Leape, L. (1991) “Incidence of adverse events and negligence in 
hospitalized patients”, New England Journal of Medicine: 324(6), pp.370-6. 
 
Cole, J., Pryce, D. and Shaw, C. (2001) The reporting of adverse clinical incident – 
achieving high quality reporting: the results of a short research study, London: CASPE 
Research. 
 
Department of Health (2000) An Organisation with a Memory, London: TSO. 
 
Department of Health (2001) Building a Safer NHS for Patients, London: TSO. 
 31 
 
Evetts, J. (2002) “New directions in state and international professional occupations: 
discretionary decision-making and acquired regulation”, Work, Employment and Society, 
vol.16(2), pp.341-53. 
 
Fox, R. (1975) “Training for Uncertainty”, in Cox, C. and Mead, A. (eds.) A Sociology of 
Medical Practice, London: Collier-Macmillan. 
  
Freidson, E. (1970) Profession of Medicine :a study in the sociology of applied 
knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Harrison, S. (2002) “New Labour, Modernisation and the Medical Labour Process”, 
Journal of Social Policy: 31(3), pp.465-85. 
 
Harrison, S. and Pollitt, C. (1995) Controlling Health Professionals, Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
 
Helmreich, R. and Merritt, A. (2001) Culture at work in aviation and medicine, 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Institute of Medicine (1999) To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, DC: 
National Academy Press. 
 
Kennedy, I. (Chair) (2001) Bristol Royal Infirmary Final Report, London: TSO. 
 32 
 
Lawton, R. and Parker, D. (2002) “Barriers to incident reporting in a health care system”, 
Quality and Safety in Health Care, vol.11, pp.15-18. 
 
Leape, L. (1999) “Error in medicine”, in Rosenthal, M., Mulcahy, L. and Lloyd-Bostock, 
S. (eds.) Medical Mishaps, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
Lupton, D. (1998) Medicine as Culture, London: Sage. 
 
Meek, L. (1988) “Organizational culture: origins and weakness”, Organization Studies, 
vol.9(4), pp.453-73. 
 
National Patient Safety Agency (2003) 7 Steps to Patient Safety, London: NPSA 
 
Paget, M. (2004) The Unity of Mistakes, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Parker, M. (2000) Organizational Culture and Identity, London: Sage. 
 
Pope, A. (1709) An Essay in Criticism, <http://classiclit.about.com/library/bl-
etexts/apope/bl-apope-essaycrit.htm> 
 
Rasmussen, J. and Jensen, A. (1974) “Mental procedures in real-life tasks: a case study of 
electronic troubleshooting”, Ergonomics, vol.17, pp.293-307. 
 33 
 
Reason, J. and Hobbs, A. (2003) Managing Maintenance Error, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Reason, J. (1999) Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, Aldershot: Ashgate.  
 
Reason, J. (2000) “Human error – models and management”, British Medical Journal, 
vol. 320, pp.768-70. 
 
Rosenthal, M. (1995) The Incompetent Doctor, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Strong, P. and Robinson, J. (1990) The NHS under new management, Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
 
Strauss,A. and Corbin, J. (1990) Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory 
procedures and techniques, London: Sage. 
 
Vincent, C. Stanhope, N. and Crowley-Murphy, M. (1999) “Reasons for not reporting 
adverse incidents: an empirical study”, Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 
vol.5(1), pp.13-21 
 
Vincent, C., Neale, G. and Woloshynowych, M. (2001) “Adverse events in British 
hospitals: preliminary retrospective review”, British Medical Journal, vol. 322, pp.517-9. 
 
 34 
Wilson, R., Runciman, W., Gibberd, R. et al. (1995) “The quality of Australian 
healthcare study”, Medical Journal of Australia, vol.163(4), pp.58-71. 
 
